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ABSTRACT
The early decades of the 20th century marked drastic changes in philosophy, science,
visual arts, literature, and music. In philosophy, this change occurred in the work of
Edmund Husserl whose Phenomenology introduced a new “way of knowing” or
epistemology. In art, the exhibition of Pablo Picasso’s Cubist Les Demoiselles d’Avignon
(1907), given its rebellious nature, began an innovative artistic tradition which called for
a new “way of seeing.” Phenomenology as theory and Cubism as practice shared a
common aim: to re-vision the world—an aim of many Modernist movements. Modernism
is an umbrella term for a mélange of artistic schools and styles, which are characterized
by such features as aesthetic self-consciousness, structural and thematic fragmentation,
and a complexity of representation. Modernism contains Phenomenology and Cubism as
twin attempts to re-vision and reconstruct the viewer’s experience of the object-world.
The aim of this thesis is twofold: 1) to outline the complex vocabulary of Husserlian
Phenomenology and Cubism, and 2) to apply those vocabularies to William Faulkner’s
texts. As examples of visual and phenomenological perspectivism, Faulkner’s The Sound
and The Fury and As I Lay Dying were explored for their correlations to Husserlian
Phenomenology and Cubism. By utilizing artistic techniques drawn from Fauvism,
Surrealism, and, Cubism, Faulkner’s novels provide literary samples for how artists
reconstruct the world visually through their art. Husserlian Phenomenology likewise aims
to reconstruct our human perceptions and experience.
KEYWORDS: modernism, Husserlian Phenomenology, Cubism, perspectivism,
Faulkner
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INTRODUCTION
Modernism presents us with a world becoming a realm of appearances—
fragments, patchwork quilts of color, dream-tableaux made out of disconnected
phantasms.
—T. J. Clark, “The Painting of Postmodern Life?” (14)
The beginning decades of the twentieth century witnessed fundamental and
drastic developments in painting, sculpture, architecture, literature, philosophy, music,
and the sciences. The arts of painting and sculpture celebrated the emergence of Henri
Matisse, Pablo Picasso, Georges Braque, Marcel Duchamp, Jean Metzinger, Alexander
Archipenko, and other brilliant, innovative artists. In philosophy and psychoanalysis,
Sigmund Freud, Henri Bergson, and Edmund Husserl among others led revolutions in the
study of human consciousness. In literature, Marcel Proust, Guillaume Apollinaire, James
Joyce, Virginia Woolf, Gertrude Stein, and a host of others experimented with forms of
writing; in fiction especially, they developed innovative and complex narrative
techniques. All these artists, thinkers, authors participated in the same cultural movement:
modernism. In an age of political and economic alienation, when forces of capitalism,
mechanization, urbanization, and the seemingly all-powerful nation-state threatened the
sovereignty of the individual, much of art retreated into the last remaining bastion of
individualism: subjective experience. As an aesthetic movement, modernism explored
our human “ways of seeing” within a larger philosophical project: an exploration of our
human “ways of knowing” or epistemology.
Modernism is a spacious container holding multiple, in fact contradictory
attitudes and movements: other revolutions—of Marxism in political economy, of
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expressionism and vorticism in art, of naturalism in literature, etc.—take their place in
early twentieth-century intellectual-aesthetic culture, though not in this present thesis. It
is not the sociology, but rather the subjectivist psychology, of modernism that is of
interest here. In 1907, Edmund Husserl published his Phenomenology (Die Idee der
Phänomenologie). In that same year, Pablo Picasso exhibited his legendary painting, Les
Demoiselles d’Avignon. While there is no direct connection between these works, both
represent an aspect of the Zeitgeist of modernism. Both works sought to re-vision the
world. The insight that drove both Phenomenology and Cubism was that the human
perceiver engages in an active construction of the object-world. For Husserl as for
Picasso, the older traditions of an “objective” realism fail to describe our subjective
“ways of knowing.” The subject cannot be alienated or removed from the object-world,
since “knowing” is an activity that occurs between the knower and the phenomenon. And
“knowing,” for Husserl as for Picasso, is a process that unfolds in time. In any given
instant, only a portion of the object-world is presented to the perceiver. In traditional
realist art, the observer “never [perceives] an object in its entirety but only a part of it, a
side, a foreshortening” (Pedragosa 749). In order to perceive an object in its wholeness,
the observer has to change location. Divided into separate instants of perception, all
“knowing” is perspectivist—partial, fragmented. By “giving the lie” to realism, Cubism
acknowledges the narrowness of any one sight-angle while using art as an antidote to that
same narrowness of perspective. The flat canvas provides the space where multiple
perceptions, perspectives, and temporalities can be constructed into a complex frame.
Modernism contains Cubism and Phenomenology as twin attempts to reveal the
constructed nature of the object-world. Phenomenology provides a vocabulary to
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illuminate the aesthetic practice of Cubism. In the ways that they approach the objectworld, Phenomenology and Cubism are mirror-images of each other or isomorphic.
While Cubism is “characterized by its representatives as an atheoretical or even
antitheoretical movement” (Pedragosa 749), Phenomenology is a theory characterized by
its study of the structures of consciousness. Hence, “What Cubism achieves by pictorial
means is what Phenomenology achieves by theoretical means” (Pedragosa 749). In other
words, Phenomenology is a theory whose destination is practice; its practice culminates
in what Husserl terms the “transcendental attitude.” Cubism, by contrast, is a practice
that gives birth to theory—specifically, a theory of constructionism. In philosophy,
Husserl explored a new way of knowing; in art, the Cubists explored a new way of
seeing.
In his 1997 essay, “New Ways of Seeing the Old: Cubism and Husserlian
Phenomenology,” Randall Slettene cites the French phenomenological philosopher
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who states that “The entire modern history of painting, with its
efforts to detach itself from illusionism and to acquire its own dimensions, has a
metaphysical significance” (Merleau-Ponty 178). Merleau-Ponty’s assertion is notable,
due to “the connection he draws between modern art and philosophical concerns”
(Slettene 104). As Slettene argues, a full understanding of the development of modern art
requires that one comprehend “the correlation between the world of [the] aesthetic and
the world of the metaphysical” (104). Though this same correlation holds throughout art
history, it receives greater attention in modernism, due to the radical developments in
both art and philosophy in the twentieth century. As Slettene notes, modernism is marked
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by radical change and discontinuity in both these fields, in each case due (at least in part)
to the “nature of visual perception” (104).
As Slettene describes them, the correlations between movements in visual art and
philosophy are of two kinds: “They are either the result of the direct and demonstrable
influence of developments in one field upon the other, or they are causally unconnected,
parallel developments that occur independently in each field at roughly the same time”
(104). One striking instance of these parallel developments, Slettene notes, is the “twin
emergence of cubism in painting and phenomenology in philosophy” (104). While
Slettene is content to note their contemporaneity, other theorists have sought firmer
connections between these fields. In Der Weg zum Kubismus, art historian Daniel-Henry
Kahnweiler relates Cubism to “certain philosophies as their pictorial analogon” (Pinotti
63). Among candidates for these “certain philosophies,” Kahnweiler includes neoKantian idealism, the existentialist phenomenology of Henry Bergson, and the preFreudian psychology of William James. But most interesting is Kahnweiler’s claim that
“One day people will certainly try to discover the connections between cubism and a
philosophy contemporary to it. It seems to me probable that Edmund Husserl will be
taken into consideration, since his phenomenology remains a transcendental idealism”
(Pinotti 64).
Can one make similar correlations among literary art, visual art, and philosophy?
In William Faulkner’s case, it appears that one can. Faulkner was among the modernist
writers whose ground-breaking narrative techniques modulated the structure of the
modern novel. The complete oeuvre of Faulkner demonstrates his abiding interest in
painting. One would expect that his early interest in modern art had some influence on his
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writing style and narrative techniques. Faulkner began drawing before he tried his hand at
writing. Arguably, his experiments in the structure of the novel correlate with many of
the innovations in modernist art, the Cubist movement particularly. His idea of how a
novel should be written marks a disjunction from his “realist” predecessors, much like
Picasso’s work diverged from artists before him.
As Joseph Blotner states in Faulkner: A Biography, Faulkner referred to the act of
novel writing as an act of building—a visual-spatial construction. Explaining how he put
A Green Bough together, Faulkner stated, “I chose the best manuscripts and built a
volume just like a novel” (Blotner 790; emphasis added). Quoting Faulkner in A Cosmos
of My Own, Panthea Reid Broughton notes that “novels are spatial, not linear
constructions” (36). According to Broughton, novelists of Faulkner’s generation wrote
“not by tracing the linear development of a single plot line, but rather by building and
arranging blocks of narrative with an eye for the sorts of patterns they were creating”
(44). The correlation between Cubism and Faulkner’s literary modernism lies in their
mirrored techniques: both seek to multiply perspectives, the former through visual
recombination, the latter through narrative.
Expanding Slettene’s approach to include literary modernism, this thesis will
explore the correlations between Phenomenology and Cubism in Faulkner’s The Sound
and The Fury and As I Lay Dying. It offers to situate his literary technique within two
vital components of modernism: Phenomenology as theory and Cubism as practice. Of
course, there are other ways of reading Faulkner, just as there are aspects of modernism
that lie beyond the purview of this thesis. Cubism, like Phenomenology, “is an occasion
to learn to see” (Pinotti 65). Can the same be said of Faulkner, that his fiction “is an
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occasion to learn to see”? Faulkner scholarship has explored the presence of modernist
art within his novels; this thesis will build upon and, perhaps, add to this scholarship.
Chapter 1 outlines the complex vocabulary of Husserlian phenomenology.
Chapter 2 outlines the visual-spatial techniques of Cubism. Chapters 3 and 4 apply these
to Faulkner’s own perspectivist art. A thesis of this scope can offer, at most, a sampling
of Faulkner’s visual/phenomenological perspectivism. It would be this work’s contention
that examples can be further multiplied throughout Faulkner’s oeuvre, and that
perspectivism can be shown to lie at the heart of his modernist aesthetic. In the following
chapters, this thesis will attempt a way of reading that shows how such a claim can be
demonstrated. If successful, this thesis will show how the Phenomenological and Cubist
vocabularies can contribute to the ongoing discussion of Faulkner’s The Sound and The
Fury and As I Lay Dying.

6

PHENOMENOLOGY

Natural objects … must be experienced before any theorizing about them can
occur.
—Edmund Husserl, “Pure Phenomenology” (125)
During the same years that Picasso and Braque’s Cubism revolutionized painting
and sculpture, dramatic changes were taking place in philosophy. In Germany, Edmund
Husserl was taking courses in astronomy, mathematics, physics, and philosophy.
Husserl’s mentor, the Czech philosopher Thomas Masaryk, was a former student of the
German philosopher Franz Brentano, with whom Husserl came into contact and whose
lectures were to have an enormous influence on Husserl’s philosophical maturation. In
the years 1900 and 1901, Husserl published his first major work, Logical Investigations
(Logische Untersuchungen). Written in two volumes, the first, titled Prolegomena to
Pure Logic (Prolegomena zur reinen Logik), was a critique of psychologism.1 The
second, titled Investigations in Phenomenology and Knowledge (Untersuchungen zur
Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis), was a larger and more ambitious
investigation into six different areas: (I) expression and meaning, (II) universals, (III) the
formal ontology of parts and wholes (mereology), (IV) the “syntactical” and mereological
structure of meaning, (V) the nature and structure of intentionality, and (VI) the
interrelation of truth, intuition and cognition. The publication of Prolegomena to Pure
Logic laid the foundations for Husserl’s analyses in Investigations in Phenomenology and
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“Psychologism is a pejorative description for the view that psychology can account for
the laws of logic” (Russell 9).
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Knowledge which, subsequently, laid the groundwork for his mature phenomenology. He
developed and refined his philosophical method into what he later called transcendental
phenomenology, publishing his influential Ideas (Ideen) in 1913.
Husserl believed that “Western philosophy was in need of a radical overhaul if it
was to fulfill its mission of being the science of sciences, the foundational realm of
systematic knowledge upon which the sciences, and in fact, the entire body of organized
inquiry, were built” (Slettene 106). Husserl believed that if philosophy was to remain
influential in the twentieth century, “its theoretical and epistemological foundations had
to be clarified in ways that would avoid the cognitive shoals and reefs upon which so
many metaphysical vessels had crashed” (Slettene 106). Husserl thought that the
foundations of philosophy will remain firm only if philosophers “consider conscious
experiences in the concrete fullness and entirety with which they figure in their concrete
context—the stream of experience—and to which they are closely attached through their
own proper essence” (Ideas 116). In other words, philosophers are required to analyze the
units of consciousness in order to comprehend the world. In his book titled
Phenomenology,2 Shaun Gallagher emphasizes two definitions:
Phenomenology is the study of human experience and of the ways things present
themselves to us in and through such experience. (Robert Sokolowski, qtd. in
Gallagher 7)
Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from
the first-person point of view. (David Woodruff Smith, qtd. in Gallagher 7)
To illustrate the definitions and to put them into simple terms, it can be explained that
Phenomenology is the study of phenomena. Edmund Husserl, who was known as the
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As citations indicate, the following outline draws extensively on Gallagher’s discussion.
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founder of phenomenology, focused on human consciousness. He believed that
consciousness is like “our window onto the world” (Gallagher 9). Basically, modern
philosophical Phenomenology tries to provide an account of how things appear to human
awareness and how the world appears to human consciousness in terms of one’s
subjective experience of it. In other words, Phenomenology reflects upon everyday
experiences to gain a sense of their order and structure.
The following section will present a brief overview of terms relevant to a
Phenomenological reading of Faulkner. It will begin with an explication of the natural
attitude.

The Natural Attitude
As mentioned previously, Phenomenology is a study of the units of
consciousness; however, the ultimate aim is to achieve a “transcendental rather than a
naturalistic analysis of consciousness” (Gallagher 41). To put it in simple terms, we are
all familiar with the natural attitude without even being aware of it, because we naturally
assume that the world around us is real, that we live in a real world, and that the objects
around us are real (Gallagher 41). Hence, the natural attitude, by virtue of its nature, is
usually taken for granted by all of us. Moreover, the natural attitude, as Gallagher notes,
is “a very practical attitude to be in,” especially for our survival (41). All of us, despite
our occupations and careers, experience the natural attitude — the real world around us
that “characterizes our everyday life” — by immersing ourselves in the natural attitude
(Gallagher 42). However, this sets the phenomenologist apart because she takes a
different attitude by bracketing the natural attitude.
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The Epoché
As mentioned above, to be in the natural attitude comes, as the name suggests,
very naturally to everyone. As people work, play, cook, eat, pay rent, and so forth, they
are in the natural attitude. The phenomenologist, however, adopts a different approach by
bracketing the natural attitude and, hence, moving into the phenomenological attitude.
This happens by “[suspending] the natural attitude [in order] to disengage from it”
(Gallagher 43). In other words, if the natural attitude consists of a “collection of beliefs,
judgments, opinions, or theories about how things work, then to bracket these established
beliefs and judgments is to set them aside” (Gallagher 43). Husserl calls this “the epoché
— a Greek word for suspension of belief” (Gallagher 43). Bracketing does not negate the
existence of the aforementioned beliefs and ideas; the phenomenon is still present to
consciousness and one can describe it and how it appears within her experience. This is
called the phenomenological residuum, which is what remains after performing the
epoché (Gallagher 44).
Husserl believed that consciousness is the only way to one’s understanding or
knowing anything, and the epoché is the first step towards reaching philosophical
understanding. When one suspends all preconceptions, incidental meanings, and
judgements about an object—a book for instance—she suspends all scientific and
metaphysical judgments about it. That does not necessarily mean that she is left with
nothing, because she still has the fresh, unprejudiced “experience of the world”
(Gallagher 44). Shaun Gallagher relates this to the idea of methodic doubt in Descartes’
Meditations, according to which Descartes begins to doubt everything because he cannot
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trust his “perceptions or his reason” (45). This whole world could be merely a dream and
the only thing one can be certain of is “the fact that he is doubting, which is a form of
thinking” (45). In other words, the only thing one cannot doubt is doubting itself: the
cogito — the “I think,” which is followed by ergo sum — “therefore, I am” (Gallagher
45). As Gallagher explains, Husserl concurs with Descartes up to the point of cogito,
which is the consciousness that “he can’t suspend or bracket out” (45).
Again, applying the bracketing technique does not negate an object’s existence,
because even if the epoché is executed, the consciousness of it remains. After one
suspends all beliefs and judgments about the world, about the universe in toto, she still
has her experiences of the world within which she is situated (Gallagher 45). For Husserl,
“this world as experienced is the very starting point of knowledge” (Gallagher 45). The
“stream of experience” remains, even after all judgements, beliefs, and opinions are
removed. Therefore, what one sees, hears, feels, and perceives is the starting point and
foundation of all subsequent knowledge (Gallagher 46). In other words, “all science starts
with our consciousness” (Gallagher 46).
To give an example, one may have a clear definition of an apple. She may even be
able to provide a scientific definition for an apple as “fruit of the domesticated tree Malus
domestica (family Rosaceae), one of the most widely cultivated tree fruits” (“Apple”).
More generally, all meaning — the meaning of the world itself — can be traced
back to experience — the way things appear to consciousness. Using the epoché,
we can, without contradiction, cut through, as it were, the empirical connection
between the experience and all thingly existence. We thereby achieve a kind of
distinctio phaenoemonologica. But what does that mean? What kind of cutting
through is that? Is it not true that experiences are experiences of experiencing
humans and, hence, that they have a relationship to a body and in insertion in
nature? Can I change anything about that? To be sure, it just so happens to be that
way. But we can indeed consider the experiences in and for themselves, without
considering them in their empirical relation. We can disengage each natural
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positing (positing of the existence of nature) in the sense that we undertake
scientific considerations, in which we make no use at all of any positing of nature
and where, accordingly, these considerations keep their validity, whether or not
nature or an intellectual-embodied world exists as such. (Gallagher 47)
The Phenomenological Reduction
The second step in the Husserlian method is the phenomenological reduction,
which some phenomenologists believe to include the epoché. In other words, the whole
process of reduction, including the epoché, could be referred to as the phenomenological
reduction. The phenomenological reduction turns one’s “attention toward the phenomena
as they appear” (Gallagher 47). In this step, what matters is what one experiences just as
she experiences it, which leads to reflection on how one experiences and how things
appear in that experience. In this step, it is essential that the individual describe what she
experiences, which might be a complex phenomenon; but it is important to describe what
she sees, and how she sees it—which is a remarkably unique experience (Gallagher 47).
Even if she observes the same object twice or thrice, each of her experiences will be
different from the previous one. Gallagher brings up an intriguing example:
What you see, even if it’s a simple thing like the apple on the desk in front of you,
may be somewhat complex. For example, in your visual experience of the apple
you can note that you see a certain complex color—it’s red, but there are various
shades of red that pattern the surface. Perhaps, it is not sitting in clear light and
there are shadows falling across its surface. Nonetheless, you seem to see it as
having a more-or-less consistent color, despite the variations that come from the
shadows. Also, there are some things you can describe about its shape. But notice
that you can’t see the entire apple all at once. You always see it in profile. It’s
quite amazing that even though you can’t see its inside, you see that the apple has
(must have) an inside. And although you can’t see the other side of the apple, you
see it as having another side. In some way you see this without seeing the other
side. Of course you can also manipulate the apple or your own position so that
you see more of it. But there seems to be a rule here that says you can’t see more
than one profile at a time, and you never see the entire apple at once, although you
do see it as a whole. You can also explore the apple by touching it or by tasting it.
If you close your eyes you can still describe what you learn from touching it and
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manipulating it. Or you can take a bite and try to describe what you taste. Such
explorations, however, only point to other ways in which the apple is perceived
incompletely. (47)
The preceding example illustrates Husserl’s phenomenological reduction, and it can be
utilized to explain how a cubist painter perceives an objet d’art. This point will be
explicated in detail in the section concerning Cubism.
In this example, one depends upon perceptions and senses rather than theoretical
or scientific knowledge; the above description is purely empirical rather than
transcendental. What, then, makes Husserlian method transcendental? As Gallagher
notes, “some phenomenologists refer to a transcendental reduction that takes the
phenomenological reduction to another level” (48). In the example provided above, what
the individual describes is not the apple itself but rather the “lived experience of the
apple” (Gallagher 48). Hence, one will not claim that the apple is red but that she
experiences it as red. Husserl attributes a kind of uniqueness to each experience of an
object, because “when part of the experience is present, some previous part of it is no
longer there” (Gallagher 49). Therefore,
This experience of the apple has its own existence, and it exists in a certain way.
Within that experience the apple appears from a certain perspective. This is the
characteristic of the experience, not of the apple. Each experience presents the
apple incompletely, and this is an essential feature of the way we experience
things. (Gallagher 48; emphasis added)
Hence, one cannot claim that “the apple is red, but that the apple appears to be red. This
is where Phenomenology shares some common ground with the art of painting. Husserl
points to the “finitude and partiality of our knowledge and perception of reality”
(Pedragosa 749). As previously mentioned, one can only capture one side or aspect of a
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given object; but, in order to have a thorough perception of that object, one needs to
capture it as a multifaceted whole.
Gallagher here refers to Husserl’s 1913 Ideas, where each experience is absolute
and there is no other side to an experience per se that one can reach by means of that
singular experience:
When we attend to the experience itself—which is an attending to the way that we
experience the world—we are starting to grasp certain aspects of experience that
can be considered transcendental. There is here a certain a priori aspect that
constrains every visual perception that we have, namely, that it involves a
perspective which limits the way in which any object appears to us. (48-49)
As Gallagher explains, this transcendental experience exists in one’s phenomenological
intuition and is permeating in one’s visual experience of the world (49).

The Eidetic Reduction
It is only “within the transcendentally reduced sphere of consciousness [that] we
can grasp the essence of the phenomenon” (Gallagher 49). Husserl calls this aspect of his
method the eidetic reduction, which stems from eidos, a Greek term for essence. The
eidetic reduction serves as an “imaginative variation” upon experience, by means of
which one uses her “imagination to change various features of the phenomenon”
(Gallagher 49). As Husserl describes this notion in Ideas, to explore consciousness is to
undertake a search for its essence or eidos: that is, for the features of human experience
that are both necessary and immutable and that, consequently, make one’s experience
what it is. To further explain, once one has turned one’s reflective awareness toward
experience by employing the phenomenological reduction, one can then undertake a
second reduction—an eidetic reduction—with respect to some more specific question.
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Husserl refers to a special moment in an individual’s reflective awareness, a moment that
he calls an intuition, when the individual realizes the essential nature of a given object.
The eidetic reduction helps create an intuition into something’s essence by employing a
method known as imaginary variation, in which the individual varies all the possible
attributes of an experience as a way of exploring what is truly necessary for the
experience to be considered what it is. For instance, what characteristics make an apple,
an apple? Gallagher gives the following example:
We can imagine the apple we see on the table in front of us being bigger or
smaller than it is; being green instead of red; being redder than it is; being more
round than it is; being heavier or lighter than it is; being more or less sweeter than
it is. We could imaginatively vary the way the apple appears by imagining
walking around it or seeing it in a different context. There are all sorts of things
that we could change about the apple. Through all of these changes it nonetheless
remains an apple. (49; emphasis added)
One may pose a myriad of questions about the apple and its distinguishing characteristics,
i.e. all the qualities that make an apple and that assist one in recognizing an apple as an
apple. Characteristics that are invariant are thus linked to the essence of an apple qua
apple: as Gallagher states, “the essence of something is equal to the set of invariables that
we can discover through this process of imaginative variation” (49). Therefore, the
eidetic reduction is a means for gaining insight into essences (Wesensschau).

The Theory of Intentionality
It was mentioned earlier that Franz Brentano exerted a profound influence on the
young Husserl; therefore, it comes as no surprise that Husserl insisted upon revisiting and
revising Brentano’s ideas. One of the main concepts that Husserl borrows from Brentano
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is the idea that consciousness is intentional3. Intentionality can be traced back to
Aristotle, “who claims to be explicating a saying from Empedocles: ‘Like is known by
like’ (homoia homoiois gignôsketei)” (Gallagher 62). Within Brentano’s model of
intentionality,
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by … what we might call, though not
wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which
is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every
mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself … (Gallagher 63;
emphasis added)
As Gallagher notes, intentionality is “the ‘aboutness’ or the ‘directionality’ that is
involved in perceiving or knowing anything” (63). Intentionality is also considered as the
“mark of the mental” (Gallagher 64). Here, too, Gallagher refers to Brentano:
Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although
they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in
judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire
desired, and so on. This intentional inexistence is characteristic exclusively of
mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We can,
therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena
which contain an object intentionally within themselves. (64)
According to Brentano, intentionality is concerned with two things:
(1)The aspect of ‘aboutness’ or ‘direction toward an object’; and
(2)The internal existence of the object perceived, judged, believed, loved, hated,
etc. (Gallagher 64)
Husserl acknowledges the first point, stating that “all consciousness is consciousness of
something” (Gallagher 64). Intentionality is derived from the Latin term intendere, which
means to “aim in a particular direction, similar to drawing and aiming a bow at a target”

3

This is a Husserlian term and is different from the English word as it is commonly
used.
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(Gallagher 64). But Husserl takes issue with the second point, in that “perceived object is
itself the intentional object, and …we have a direct perceptual access to that object,
without any intermediary” (Gallagher 64-65). According to Husserl, when a physical
object is perceived, or even when a non-physical object is imagined or conceived, it is
imagined from a certain perspective. The Husserlian “imaginative variation” comes into
play, since it is impossible for two people to perceive the same object from precisely the
same angle. As Gallagher notes, “The way I see the palm tree next to my house is not
precisely how you see it, since you see it from a different angle from where you stand;
the way I think of Hamlet is not precisely how you think of Hamlet, since you’ve played
the part and I haven’t” (65-66). This kind of consideration leads Husserl to the concept of
noema.
In Husserlian phenomenology, intentionality denotes two things simultaneously.
First, the intentionality of consciousness means that it is actional in nature: that is,
consciousness is always doing something. Second, the intentionality of consciousness
means that it is referential in nature—that it is always pointing to something. In other
words, when one perceives, feels, or judges or thinks, her “mental state is about or of
something” (Gallagher 64; emphasis added). The following visual schema (Fig 1) helps
explain.

Noesis-noema
As it was mentioned previously, Brentano and Husserl established that “all
consciousness is consciousness of something” as the first aspect of intentionality
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(Gallagher 67). Moreover, they both believed that intentionality is a “directionality
toward something” (Gallagher 68). Husserl rejected Brentano on the second aspect of

Figure 1. Basic Phenomenological Concepts: Two perspectives of the same
phenomena. Retrieved from webspace.ship.edu/cgboer/qualmethone.html, and has
been edited to fit the purposes of this thesis.

intentionality which, according to Brentano, was the idea that “there is some kind of
phenomena
internal ‘inexisting’ intentional object in the mind” (Gallagher 68). Husserl, however,
suggested that “consciousness has a certain structure which can be expressed as
‘consciousness of something as something’” (Gallagher 68). Husserl differs from
Brentano in the sense that he analyzes consciousness into two parts. The noesis refers to
the act of consciousness in knowing, whereas the noema refers to the object as structured
in consciousness. The relation between the two is what Husserl calls the noetic-neomatic
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correlate. The noetic act of consciousness can stem from memory, imagination or
perception (Gallagher 68). Here again, Gallagher sets forth an example:
I can be conscious of the same object in different ways: I can perceive an apple
tree, or remember one, or imagine one; I can judge the apple tree to be large; I can
dislike the tree because it is blocking my view, etc…. My judgment may be fed
by my memory of certain facts (I may remember falling out of an apple tree as a
kid); by imagining certain things (e.g., imagining what it would look like if the
apple tree were not there); by my dislike of apple trees, etc. likewise, my
consciousness of the apple tree has one intentional object—the apple tree. But I
am always experiencing the apple tree in a certain way. As perceived, it appears
visually from a certain perspective. Like the apple on my desk, I can see the apple
tree only from one side at a time, for example, although when I see it from one
side I also implicitly see it as having more than one side. If the wind is blowing,
or if clouds are interrupting the sunlight, the appearance of the tree is constantly
changing. Also, if I move and change my angle of perception, there is a
corresponding shift in appearance of the tree. Throughout all of these noematic
changes, the intentional object is the same apple tree. Likewise, if I close my eyes
and then remember what the apple tree just looked like; or if I imagined what that
apple tree would look like in a different place; or if I judged that the apple tree
was getting too big—all of these differences would have corresponding noematic
changes. The noema is the meaning or sense (German: Sinn) that the apple tree
has for me as I perceive or remember or judge, etc.—the apple tree as
experienced, or as it appears to me. (Gallagher 68-69)
The object is the same in each of these cases, though what makes the experience different
is the “character of the act of consciousness directed at it” (Gallagher 68). According to
Husserl, “consciousness has this kind of intentional structure, where on one side we have
the noetic act (or act of consciousness) and on the other side we have the noematic
meaning—the way things are experienced” (Gallagher 69). In the above example, what
one sees is not the noema, because noema is how one sees—the tree “as shimmering in
the breeze,” for instance. Hence, as Gallagher notes, “the noema is to be understood
neither as an ideal meaning, nor a concept, nor a proposition; it is not an intermediary
between subject and object; rather, it is the object precisely as experienced” (70).
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In sum, Husserlian phenomenology seeks to describe the workings of consciousness
within our perception of the object-world. To move from the natural attitude toward the
phenomenological and eidetic reduction is a goal of Husserlian method; as an exercise in
perspectivism, much of Cubism can be described within the vocabulary outlined above.

20

CUBISM

Cubism … is like standing at a certain point on a mountain and looking around. If
you go higher, things will look different; if you go lower, again they will look
different. It is a point of view.
—Jacques Lipchitz (qtd. in Van Bork 199)

Cubism: A Stylistic and Historical Phenomenon
Cubism is an early twentieth-century avant-garde art movement which developed
between the years 1907 and 1914 and impacted numerous artists, sculptors, musicians,
and writers even after its decline from 1914 until about 1925. It was initiated by Georges
Braque and Pablo Picasso in Paris, and, due to geographical, cultural, and historical
reasons, it might never have been anything but a Parisian phenomenon had it not been for
the cosmopolitan nature of that city, which attracted artists and writers from Spain, Italy,
Germany, and other countries such as Russia and the Low Countries (Fry, Modern Artist
11). Therefore, Paris, this cultural mecca, was the center for a gathering of great artistic
minds “whose presence constituted an intellectual ‘critical mass’ that soon produced a
series of revolutionary cultural explosions,” the first of which was in painting (Fry,
Modern Artist 12).
Labeled as “Fauvism” and commencing in 1904, the work of Henri Matisse and
his followers “used color with unprecedented freedom, intensity and arbitrariness” (Fry,
Modern Artist 12). Matisse was followed by André Derain and Maurice de Vlaminck in
the discovery and admiration of African and Oceanic art, which impacted Cubism briefly.
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Fauvism did not develop further than the late nineteenth century and it was, in
nature, an expansion of such movements as the pointillism of Signac, “the brilliant
coloristic achievements and expressive brushwork of Vincent Van Gogh, and Paul
Gauguin’s decorative color patterns” (Fry, Modern Artist 12). Matisse’s Bonheur de
Vivre (The Joy of life) (Fig 2), which does not offer any new concept of space or depth,
represents the fundamentally representational nature of the Fauvist painting.

Figure 2. Henri Matisse, Bonheur de Vivre (Joy of Life), oil on canvas, 1905-06. The
Barnes Foundation, Philadelphia. Retrived from www.henrimatisse.org/joy-of-life.jsp
It was in such an artistic background that Pablo Picasso’s Les Demoiselles
d’Avignon (Fig 3) emerged in 1907, abandoning all known representation of traditional
art. Though Picasso’s painting is often described as a further step down the path of
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Figure 3. Pablo Picasso, Les Demoiselles d'Avignon, 1907, oil on canvas, Museum
of Modern Art, New York City. Retrieved from www.pablopicasso.org/avignon.jsp

Fauvism, some critics believe that Picasso was in fact reacting against Matisse’s Bonheur
de Vivre and Nu Bleu (Blue Nude). Les Demoiselles embraced new approaches to the
concept of space and the expression of emotions and states of mind. Les Demoiselles,
which is a revolutionary work of art, breaks away from the characteristics of Renaissance
painting which followed “the classical norm for the human figure, and the spatial
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illusionism of one-point perspective” (Fry, Modern Artist 13). Picasso’s new approach to
the human figure, which he had been pursuing for a year before completion of the
painting, manifests itself “in such details as the reduction of human anatomy to
geometrical lozenges and triangles, as well as in the abandonment of normal anatomical
proportions” (Fry, Modern Artist 13). The influence of African sculpture is strikingly
conspicuous in the mask-like faces of the two right-hand figures in the painting.
Previously, Picasso had been fascinated by the elongated figures of Doménikos
Theotokópoulos—known as El Greco—and by the work of the post-Impressionist
painter, Paul Gauguin, but the influence of African sculpture on his Les Demoiselles and
his later work is indisputable.
What Picasso was after—“the creation of a new system of indicating threedimensional relationships that would no longer be dependent on the conventions of
illusionistic, one point perspective”—had been anticipated by Paul Cezanne, whose work
Picasso had observed in various large exhibitions in Paris, beginning in 1904 (Fry,
Modern Artist 14).
As it was mentioned above, Phenomenology as a new “way of knowing” and
Cubism as a new “way of seeing” were twin attempts at re-visioning reality. Andreas
Pinotti states, “cubism does the same as phenomenology” (Pinotti 64). He adds, “Cubist
painting is thus not an object of phenomenology among other objects, but is in itself
phenomenological” (64). To explain Pinotti’s point, it is essential to go back to Husserl
and his Ideas. Husserl develops his ideas around the concept of perception of an object
which he connects to consciousness and experience. According to Husserl, one can never
see an entire object all at once. In Ideas, he illustrates:
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If I remain purely within the realm of seeing, I find new differences arising in
very manifold form in the course of any normal seeing…. I express this somewhat
in the following way: the pure thing seen that is visible “of” the thing, is first of
all a surface, and in the changing course of seeing I see it now from this “side,”
now from that, continuously perceiving it from ever different sides. But in them
the surface exhibits itself to me in a continuous synthesis; each side is for
consciousness a manner of exhibition of it. This implies that, while the surface is
immediately given, I mean more than it offers. (Ideas 108)
In the preceding passage, Husserl describes the constructivist activity of perception. Later
in Ideas, he elaborates upon his example:
Keeping this table steadily in view as I go around it, changing my position in
space all the time, I have continually the consciousness of the bodily presence out
there of this one and self-same table, which in itself remains unchanged
throughout. But the perception of the table is one that changes continuously, it is a
continuum of changing perceptions. I close my eyes. My other senses are inactive
in relation to the table. I have now no perception of it. I open my eyes, and the
perception returns. The perception? Let us be more accurate. Under no
circumstances does it return to me individually the same. Only the table is the
same, known as identical through the synthetic consciousness which connects the
new perception with the recollection. (Ideas 130)
Though the object remains, one’s perceptions “change continuously” (Ideas 130), making
each perception a unique experience. Furthermore, one will always see the object from
one side, so one can never see an object in its three-dimensionality; rather, the object will
be perceived in single profile. As an act of imagination, however, the mind supplies the
missing/hidden sides. The perceiver “knows” that the (hidden) sides of the object exist
because of the “synthetic consciousness, which connects the new perception with the
recollection” (Ideas 130). It is this synthetic consciousness that aids one’s recollection of
the existence of the entirety (all the sides of the object) that makes the complete mental
Gestalt of the object possible.
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As mentioned, Cubism contributes to modernism a way of seeing that brings into
practice the Husserlian phenomenological attitude. Taking Picasso’s Les Demoiselle
d’Avignon as evidence, the painting depicts five nude ladies who are “constructed” out of
geometrical lozenges and triangles. The right-hand figure is depicted in a seated position
with her back to the viewer, but Picasso’s painting illustrates her full figure. By
constructing an image of three-dimensionality within a two-dimensional space, Picasso
enacts the Husserlian “synthetic consciousness,” which takes the backside of the figure
and brings it to the forefront. According to Husserl, the viewer is not capable of seeing
the figure in its entirety all at once, so the synthetic consciousness completes that image
in one’s mind.
Prior to Cubism, painters were constantly in search of a way to create the illusion
of a three-dimensional space. Linear perspective and tonal gradation were among the
techniques they used. Linear perspective is “a system of creating an illusion of depth on a
flat surface. All parallel lines (orthogonals) in a painting or drawing using this system
converge in a single vanishing point on the composition’s horizon line” (“Linear
Perspective”). Similarly, tonal gradation in art is a “visual technique of gradually
transitioning from one colour hue to another, or from one shade to another, or one texture
to another. Space, distance, atmosphere, volume, and curved or rounded forms are some
of the visual effects created with gradation” (Martin 36). By making objects bigger and
much clearer when they are close-up, and smaller and less clear when they are further
away, a painter can create the illusion of space. Similarly, painters can use tones
(shadows) to create this illusion.
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However, Cubists believed that the so-called “illusion of space” does not offer a
very faithful image of reality—that is, it does not remain loyal to the physicality and
spatiality of the object-world. Therefore, they attempted to provide a more real, accurate,
and complete portrayal of an object, person, or landscape. The Cubist painter represents
an object from various angles by “building it” out of flat geometric shapes. This approach
displays the object from different sides simultaneously. Though it reduces threedimensional reality to a two-dimensional construct, still it represents a synthesis of
perspectives.
There are two phases of Cubism: analytical Cubism and synthetic Cubism. During
the analytical phase, painters would (as the name suggests) analyze—in effect, “cut up”
or take apart—the subject matter (whether an object, person, or landscape) in an attempt
to provide a genuine and precise picture of its components. Having observed the subject
closely, they would then show it using flat geometric shapes, lines, planes, and angles,
eliminating one dimension and reinforcing the two-dimensional quality. In this early
phase, Cubist painters used almost no tonal differentiation, so there would be no highly
dark or highly light colors. Emphasizing muted tones, such as black, grey and ochre and
the like, this analytical phase lasted until 1912. The austerity and gloominess of this
phase gave place to the brighter colors and simpler lines and shapes of the synthetic
phase around 1912. Cubists began using collage alongside paint to add texture to their
work. Instead of portraying an object in its real shape, they would envisage a new
structural relations between components and, by doing so, they would create a novel
representation in the form of collage. This made extreme room for creativity and
invention of unique approaches to painting.
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In August 1925, Faulkner arrived in Paris, “that merry childish sophisticated coldblooded dying city to which Cezanne was dragged by his friends like a reluctant cow,
where Degas and Manet fought obscure points of color and line and love, cursing
Bougereau [sic] and his curved pink female flesh, where Matisse and Picasso yet painted”
(Blotner 162-63). Faulkner’s preoccupation with art movements, especially the works of
Cezanne and Cubists is evident in the letters he sent home.
Similar to Gertrude Stein, James Joyce, and Virginia Woolf, and multiple other
modernist writers, William Faulkner experimented with verbal and narrative techniques
in his novels and short stories. He began to draw and sketch at the same time as he wrote
stories and composed poems. It is significant to note that, like Sherwood Anderson,
Herman Hesse, D.H. Lawrence, and Henry Miller—all who practiced both writing and
drawing or painting simultaneously—Faulkner experimented with both drawing and
writing.
Encouraged by his two brilliant mentors, Sherwood Anderson and William
Spratling, Faulkner had considered studying art and a future career in painting before
dedicating himself thoroughly to writing. Faulkner’s adroit mentor, William Spratling,
was an American artist and silver-designer whose effort and influence rekindled the
native silver craft. Since Spratling had been to the École des Beaux-Arts in Paris, he had
thorough exposure to the Modern European arts, which he conveyed to Faulkner; in his
further advice to Faulkner, he recommended that the young American educate himself
prior to his European expedition.
As mentioned above, the aim of this thesis is not to provide a phenomenological
reading per se, but to demonstrate the correlation between Phenomenology and Cubism.
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Both offer new ways of seeing and, as such, beg comparison to Faulkner’s novelistic
techniques in The Sound and The Fury and As I Lay Dying. As Andrea Pinotti notes, “the
real point … does not consist in a phenomenological interpretation of cubism … but
rather in the hypothesis that cubism does the same as phenomenology” (64). He refers to
Albert Gleizes and Jean Metzinger’s Du Cubism, which defines multiperspectivity as
“the simultaneous representation of the object in its various aspects that would be offered
to perception only successively, gained through a rotation of the object or of the subject
around the object” (Pinotti 64). By this illuminating observation, Gleizes and Jean
Metzinger provide a more or less accurate account of how Cubism takes Phenomenology
and outs its theory into practice.
As previously discussed, in his Ideas and through the development of his
phenomenological methods and ideas, Husserl provides a striking illustration of how one
perceives an object. It is the act of consciousness that makes the object appear as a unity:
so even though one does not perceive the entire object, she synthesizes it imaginatively,
thereby maintaining its integrity as a multi-sided phenomenon. What Husserl explains is
what Picasso sought after: “the creation of a new system of indicating three-dimensional
relationships that would no longer be dependent on the conventions of illusionistic, onepoint perspective” (Fry, Modern Artist 14). The Cubists attempted to bring into vision the
entire object so the observer can see the object in its entirety.
Faulkner’s The Sound and The Fury and As I Lay Dying both function
analogously to Husserlian Phenomenology and the Cubists’ idea of perception. The
novels’ fragmented structures and multiple narrators work in such a way as to synthesize
the few events Faulkner has chosen to recount. Furthermore, by devoting individual
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sections to each character, Faulkner provides accounts of each character’s different point
of view, similar to what Husserl explains about each person’s different experiences. To
provide an aide-memoire, according to his phenomenological reduction, when one
perceives an object, what one experiences is unique; so even if one observes the same
object repeatedly, each of her experiences is different from the previous ones. In the
following chapter, this thesis will provide examples of this larger correlation between
Cubist perspectivism, Husserlian Phenomenology, and Faulknerian experiments in
structure.
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FAULKNER’S THE SOUND AND THE FURY

In . . . modernist novel[,] the attention turns inward to the movements of the
protagonist’s minds and consequently the external world is presented as a
fragmented perception through a series of overlapping interior impressions.
—Maria Teresa Cabrera, “Benjy’s Memory and Desire” (1)

Written and published in 1929, The Sound and The Fury is Faulkner’s fourth
published novel. Set in in Jefferson, Mississippi, the novel is built out of four separate,
distinct narratives, each belonging to a different member of the Compsons, a family of
former Southern aristocrats who are struggling with the dissolution of their family and its
reputation. The title of the novel is taken from Macbeth’s soliloquy in Act V, Scene V of
William Shakespeare’s tragedy, Macbeth:
Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow,
Creeps in this petty pace from day to day,
To the last syllable of recorded time;
And all our yesterdays have lighted fools
The way to dusty death. Out, out, brief candle!
Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player,
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage,
And then is heard no more. It is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing. (5.5.19-28)
The title is appropriate, given that a section of The Sound and The Fury is indeed “told by
an idiot” (SF 5.5.26-27), Benjy. By describing life as a “tale,” Shakespeare’s Macbeth
hits on a popular modernist theme: in place of objective “history,” Faulkner gives his
readers competing narratives. Whether these narratives “signify” anything beyond
“sound” and “fury” is debatable. Before literary modernism, novels were typically

31

narrated from a singular point-of-view, sometimes first-person, sometimes third-person.
This unified presentation can be compared to the vanishing-point perspective of classical
painting: the visual composition is designed to be viewed from one single, privileged
standpoint. (To view the artwork from any other standpoint creates visual distortions.) By
fragmenting the “family history” of the Compsons into four distinct narratives by four
distinct narrators, Faulkner builds a sort of Cubist multiperspectivism into the novel’s
structure.
The novel was initially criticized for its untraditional structure. Eventually, as
readers became more familiar with modernist techniques, Faulkner’s experimentations in
structure won much-deserved praise. The stream-of-consciousness technique, which was
initially practiced by European modernist writers such as James Joyce and Virginia
Woolf, emphasizes the subjectivity of experience—which, as it moves associatively from
moment to moment, captures fragments of the object-world. More than interpret,
Faulkner’s reader must construct the multi-layered plot imaginatively, walking around its
multi-perspectives. In this sense, reading Faulkner resembles the Husserlian “eidetic
reduction,” which relies on memory and imagination to synthesize disparate perceptions.
Though the whole is never “objectively” present to the reader/perceiver, the perceiver
nonetheless builds a Gestalt, however subjective and fleeting, out of shifting standpoints.
Following Husserlian Phenomenology, each of Faulkner’s characters has a unique
way of perceiving the object-world. Therefore, the uniqueness of each individual rests in
the uniqueness of his or her experience—his or her ways of being “in the world.” Each
narrator’s perspective in The Sound and The Fury is individual, subjective, and
expressive of his or her unique character. This chapter’s focus will be on Benjy
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Compson’s subjective experience and unique perception of the object-world. Also, there
will be an exploration of the techniques of “cast shadow” and the multiplication of
perspectives in Benjy’s narration.
As Leon Edel describes it, Benjy’s section requires a new way of reading, one that
gives up chronology and causality in narrative—the stuff of traditional “realism.” Benjy’s
section is nonlinear, and the reader should attempt to experience Benjy’s consciousness
as it is presented. Edel writes, "Indeed, when an author elects to tell us a story in this
fashion, it would seem logical to follow him in his premises and not to construct new
ones. In accepting the material in its scrambled state and seeking to understand it, we are
invited by Faulkner to place ourselves within the angle of vision or perception of Benjy;
we are involved with point of view” (164; emphasis added). Though Edel is unaware of
the Phenomenology underlying this description, his reference to Benjy’s unique “angle of
vison” accords with the Husserlian eidetic reduction. In other words, our task is to
experience the world as Benjy experiences it; in which case, our own fragmented
perceptions are privileged over our attempts at meaning-making (that is, at rendering
Benjy’s narrative into a coherent, “realist” world-picture). From a Husserlian perspective,
it is not the meaning but, rather, the experience of Benjy’s world that readers are to strive
for.
The novel begins with the narration of Benjy, who is the thirty-three-year-old,
mentally-handicapped son of the Compsons. Benjy’s section has the most convoluted
narration, not due merely to the complicated vocabulary and sentence structures, but due
to the narrative techniques that Faulkner employs in the writing of this section. Some of
these techniques—like stream of consciousness, dislocation of time and space, and
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repetition—belong to the artistry of the novel, while others, like “cast shadow,” belong to
surrealist art.
It’s curious to consider the possibility that Benjy’s consciousness comes closest
to pure perception—what Husserl calls the Phenomenological reduction—in transcending
the “prison house” of language. Unfettered by abstraction and prejudgment, his
perceptions come as raw sensual data. More than other characters, his experiences
commune closely with the object-world. Still, the concreteness of his experience comes at
a price: lacking language, Benjy remains “trapped” in his own subjectivity.
By its visual nature, painting privileges concrete perception over linguistic
abstraction. Simonides of Ceos’s expression that “Painting is mute poetry” (qtd. from
Plutarch, Moralia (346 f) in Jean Hagstrum 10) reinforces this point beautifully; as
Leonardo da Vinci famously stated, “Painting is poetry that is seen rather than felt, and
poetry is painting that is felt rather than seen.” Taken literally, these artists declare the
epistemology of eyesight: the eye has its own “ways of knowing” that exceed language.
Benjy’s section does not provide any evidence of him communicating through
words with other characters, and that might have been the reason some critics refer to him
as deaf and dumb. Benjy might be mute throughout the story, but Faulkner portrays him
through other means of communication. The “words” constituting Benjy’s section are, in
Husserlian terms, “bracketed.” They stand in the place of raw perception. That is, we are
meant to look “through” the words, and not “at” them. To achieve the Phenomenological
reduction implicit in Benjy’s perceptions, we must “translate” his words into the bright
color-palette of a Fauvist painter. For Benjy’s consciousness presents the object-world as
a moving canvas of bright colors and shapes.
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Again, Faulkner is helping readers experience the object-world in a manner evocative of
Husserl’s Phenomenological reduction.

Benjy’s Artistic Vision
It is presumable that Faulkner was acquainted with art movements such as
Dadaism and Surrealism, for which Cubism was a source of inspiration. Around 1912,
after Cubism had completed its development and began its decline, several other
movements arose to join it and, eventually, take its place. Born in Zurich in 1916,
Dadaism was an avant-garde art movement developed in reaction to World War I. Not
surprisingly, the work of Dadaists challenged the reigning aesthetics of art; and,
following in the steps of other artists of the time, Dadaists published a collection of their
principles in Hugo Ball’s 1916 Dada Manifesto. Even though Dadaism had come to an
end by 1920, its participants joined, and brought many Dadaist elements to, the Surrealist
Movement, which was pioneered by Andre Breton. In 1924—the year before Faulkner’s
arrival in Paris—Breton published Le Manifeste du Surréalisme in the French capitol
city.
Dadaism and Surrealism remained popular, due to their practitioners’ involvement
in Parisian social gatherings, demonstrations, and soirees. As mentioned above, Faulkner
began as a graphic artist, and, therefore, he would have been keenly interested in the
French avant-garde art movements, namely Cubism, Dadaism, Futurism, and Vorticism.
Curiously, their influence would be felt in his fiction more than in his graphic art.
Faulkner’s drawings followed the accepted and traditional rules of representational art,
which had been scorned by the practitioners of these new movements. In a letter to his
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mother dated September 21, Faulkner wrote, “And Cezanne! That man dipped his brush
in light like Tobe Caruthers would dip his in red lead to paint a lamp-post” (Selected
Letters 47). Faulkner’s description suggests an excessive piling-on of paint that calls
attention to its texture on canvas. It is the raw, sensuous effect, rather than the illusionist
subject, that caught Faulkner’s eye.
Richard P. Adams cites a 1958 interview, which emphasizes the impact of
Cézanne, Impressionism, and Post-Impressionism on Faulkner. In the interview, Kraige
Klosson asked Faulkner
to comment on the theory of a critic "who is of the opinion that on your first trip
to France you became familiar with the works of several of the French
impressionists, and especially Cézanne, and who has found a similarity in your
use of color in your books and Cézanne's use of color in his paintings." Faulkner
said, "I think that criticism probably has a great deal of merit in it. As I was
saying before, a writer remembers everything he ever reads or ever sees and then
when he needs it, he draws upon his memory and uses it." Mr. Klosson pressed
for a more definite statement: "Then, Sir, when you were in Paris you did go to
the art galleries and did [you] see and remember the paintings of Cézanne?"
Faulkner said, "Yes, that's right.” (qtd. in Branch 46-47)
What Adams refers to here is not Cézanne’s use of color per se, but, rather, to his manner
of “laying on patches of color” on canvas, “until the forms emerged” (qtd. in Branch 47).
This was a method which involved the viewer equally as the painter, since it demanded
that the viewer “enter into the process of constructing the picture along with the painter,
to recapitulate and bring to life the painter’s experience of the scene” (Branch 47).
Therefore, while the overall structure of Faulkner’s novel has strongest resemblance to
Cubism, Faulkner’s imagery—particularly in Benjy’s section—draws locally on other art
movements, such as Impressionism, Post-Impressionism, Futurism, and Vorticism
(Hönnighausen 559).
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In 1924, the poet and critic André Breton published The Surrealist Manifesto. As
he described this movement, “surrealism was a means of reuniting conscious
and unconscious realms of experience so completely that the world
of dream and fantasy would be joined to the everyday rational world in ‘an absolute
reality, a surreality’” (“Surrealism”). Benjy’s inability to distinguish mirrored-reflectedshadowed images from concrete objects makes for a further complexity in perception.
While his experience of the natural world remains largely Fauvist, his engagements with
other humans (and with himself as a shadow-casting human) make for Surrealist effects.
In Benjy’s section, the terms “shadow,” “window,” “mirror,” and “shapes” recur. First, it
is suggestive in his narration that Benjy perceives shadows “surrealistically,” since he
observes them walk independently of the object (whether human or natural) to which
they are bound: “The flower tree by the parlor window wasn’t dark, but the thick trees
were. The grass was buzzing in the moonlight where my shadow walked on the grass”
(SF 46). Benjy puts it as though he considers his shadow a separate human being: “We
went along the brick walk, with our shadows. The pig pen smelled like pigs. The cow
stood in the lot, chewing at us. Dan howled” (SF 35). He insists, “Our shadows moved,
but Dan’s shadow didn’t move except to howl when he did” (SF 35). Benjy claims, “We
went down the steps, where our shadows were,” as though they and their shadows are
separate individuals, and their shadows have been anticipating them down the steps rather
than accompanying them. In another part, Benjy observes: “Our shadows were on the
grass. They got to the trees before we did. Mine got there first. Then we got there, and
then the shadows were gone. There was a flower in the bottle. I put the other flower in it”
(SF 54). This descriptive technique recalls the 1962 Surrealist painting by Remedios
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Varo, titled Fenomeno (Fig 4), which might make the understanding of Faulkner’s
personification easier.

Figure 4. Remedios Varo, Fenomeno. 1962, oil on masonite, private collection. This
painting is retrieved from http://remedios-varo.com/obras-remedios-varo/decada1960/fenomeno-1962/
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In Varo’s painting, since each individual (the man and his shadow) are separate
beings, their perceptions and experiences are also unique and separate from each other.
This makes for a Surrealist variation on Husserl’s Phenomenological reduction, since
both the man and his shadow will have different angles of seeing.
In another passage, Benjy observes:
"Caddy." Father said. Jason was crying. He wasn't fighting anymore, but we could
see Caddy fighting in the mirror and Father put me down and went into the mirror
and fought too. He lifted Caddy up. She fought. Jason lay on the floor, crying. He
had the scissors in his hand. Father held Caddy. "He cut up all Benjy's dolls."
Caddy said. "I'll slit his gizzle." "Candace." Father said. "I will." Caddy said. "I
will." She fought. Father held her. She kicked at Jason. He rolled into the corner,
out of the mirror. Father brought Caddy to the fire. They were all out of the
mirror. Only the fire was in it. Like the fire was in a door. (SF 64-65)
This part of Benjy’s section combines Cubist and Surrealist effects. First, from where he
stands, and from the angle he looks, “we could see Caddy fighting in the mirror” (SF 65).
When Benjy states, “Father went into the mirror and fought too,” he has effectively
doubled the images of these figures, seeing them both front-and-back. (Such is the effect
of observing figures that stand in front of a mirror.) When Caddy kicks Jason, “He [rolls]
into the corner, out of the mirror,” and it is as though Jason exits the frame of
perception—as if he had truly been “inside” the mirror physically, rather than merely a
surface image. As Benjy perceives it, the mirror multiplies perspectives—like a cubist
painting. It also, for Benjy, provides a substitute reality—a surreality.
In another part of the first fragment of the novel, Benjy describes: “There was a
fire. It was rising and falling on the walls. There was another fire in the mirror, I could
smell the sickness” (SF 61). From where he stands, Benjy sees two fires instead of one
and counts the reflection of the fire as a second real fire. Another character would not
have the same perception, but for Benjy, there are two fires.
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The technique of visual repetition has long been practiced by painters, illustrators,
and sculptors. In the same way, Cubists used repetition as a technique, and what appeared
in the works of Pablo Picasso, George Braque, and Juan Gris was subsequently practiced
by writers such as Gertrude Stein, who “wrote portraits or still lives of people, groups or
things repeating words and sentences over and over again with small variations or
gradual modulations (Steidele 149). Writing of Stein’s Book Concluding With As A Wife
Has A Cow: A Love Story, Angela Steidele argues that Stein “circles her subject and
defines it in a way analogous to the analytic Cubist’s presentation of an object from
successive points of view” (Steidele 149). Stein exhausts her narration with the
employment of endless repetitions. As in modernist painting, repetition multiplies
perspectives in Benjy’s section of The Sound and The Fury.
At the beginning of Benjy’s section, Caddy insists, “Keep your hands in your
pockets, Caddy said. Or they’ll get froze. You don’t want your hands froze on Christmas,
do you” (SF 5). Variations of the same sentence are repeated on different pages by other
characters, as well. Also, at the beginning of his narration, Benjy claims:
I could hear Queenie's feet and the bright shapes went smooth and steady on both
sides, the shadows of them flowing across Queenie's back. They went on like the
bright tops of wheels. Then those on one side stopped at the tall white post where
the soldier was. But on the other side they went on smooth and steady, but a little
slower. (SF 11)
The preceding paragraph has a parallel in Dilsey’s section:
Ben's voice roared and roared. Queenie moved again, her feet began to clop-clop
steadily again, and at once Ben hushed. Luster looked quickly back over his
shoulder, then he drove on. The broken flower drooped over Ben's fist and his
eyes were empty and blue and serene again as cornice and facade flowed
smoothly once more from left to right, post and tree, window and doorway and
signboard each in its ordered place. (SF 320-21)
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The repetition of words and images makes it appear as though the novel sits between two
mirrors, each reflecting the other. This mirroring occurs between other Faulkner’s
characters as well, such as between Quentin Compson and Darl Bundren, Benjy and
Vardaman, Caddy and Addie, and Mr. Compson and Anse.
While examples can be multiplied, the analyses above should demonstrate that
The Sound and the Fury incorporates a variety of artistic techniques drawn from
Fauvism, Surrealism, and, Cubism. This, in itself, is a point worth making. Of equal
importance is the effect of these techniques upon Faulkner’s readers: just as avant-garde
artists reconstruct the world visually, so Husserlian Phenomenology seeks to reconstruct
our human perceptions and experience. The life-worlds of Faulkner’s narrators differ,
because their “ways of knowing” differ. And, in reading, we experience their life-worlds
from within our own. For instance, Benjy observes: “We went down the steps, where our
shadows were” (SF 35). Here we, as readers, are placed inside two perspectivist frames,
both Benjy’s and his shadow’s. From where he stands—above the stairs—Benjy cannot
see things from the same angle as his personified shadow. Yet we, as readers and
imaginative viewers of this scene, have access to both perspectives. And, because we can
synthesize our own experiences phenomenologically, we achieve a multi-perspectivist
attitude that the characters themselves cannot reach.
Faulkner continues his modernist-art experimentations in his fifth novel, As I Lay
Dying—the subject to which this thesis now turns.
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AS I LAY DYING

This fragmentary structure is the core of Faulkner’s novelistic vision, describing a
world of broken orders, a world in which the meetings of men and words need to
be imagined again.
—Donald M. Kartiganer, The Fragile Thread (xiii)

[By] repeating geometric designs—lines and circles, verticals and horizontals—
Faulkner actually facets, like a cubist painting, the design of this book. That is
why it is so difficult to speak of theme in As I Lay Dying. Here we have a work of
fiction that comes remarkably close to being an exercise in pure design, a true
tour de force, a cubist novel.
—Panthea Reid Broughton, “Faulkner's Cubist Novels” (93)

Faulkner’s As I Lay Dying begins: “Jewel and I come up from the field, following
the path in single file. Although I am fifteen feet ahead of him, anyone watching us from
the cotton house can see Jewel’s frayed and broken straw hat a full head above my own”
(3). These opening sentences embody the perspectivism explored in previous chapters.
By referencing the distance between himself and Jewel, Darl Bundren briefly invites a
side-angle view, one that observes the space of fifteen feet that separates them. Darl is
himself imagining the distance. As he walks, he looks ahead but imagines what is behind
him; at the same time, he calls attention to (and, thus, is aware of) the path on either side.
The world that he walks in is three-dimensional, though he can only imagine (in
Husserlian terms, conserve) what appears behind him. But then, in his imagination, he
takes himself out of his own synthetic, spatial experience and creates another perception
entirely. He imagines himself as seen from another viewpoint—by another person, an
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“anyone,” up ahead in the cotton house. What that outside viewer “can see” is, in effect, a
modernist image: a flattening of space from three to two dimensions, with Darl and Jewel
fused into a single, surrealist image. Flattening out the physical distance that separates
Jewel’s head from his own, Darl imagines their heads as if stacked on a totem pole.
It is thematically significant that the novel opens with a “painterly” perception
that multiplies visual angles and perspectives. Darl sees from one viewpoint, the path and
cotton house straight ahead of him; he conserves or imagines another viewpoint, of Jewel
walking behind; and he constructs a third viewpoint, of himself and Jewel being observed
by another person. Phenomenology is the study of phenomena—that is, of “appearances.”
For Husserl, the viewer constructs the object-world out of an active synthesis of primarily
visual perceptions and imaginings. In offering to read Faulkner phenomenologically, this
thesis makes no claims that Faulkner had direct knowledge of Husserl or of other
existential/ phenomenological studies. After all, Husserl’s philosophy seeks to describe
what actually happens when people experience the object-world. By describing the
means to achieve the “transcendental attitude,” his method seeks to refine people’s
experience by reawakening and enriching perception; but, basically, Husserl is providing
a vocabulary to describe people’s “ways of knowing.” Hence, a phenomenological
reading of Faulkner (or of any modern novelist) uses the Husserlian vocabulary to
highlight the perceptions and experiences of literary characters and the ways they
construct those experiences into coherent life-worlds. Characters’ life-worlds will be
unique, because their experiences will be unique.
Additionally, Faulkner invites this sort of reading through his awareness of
modernist art; as mentioned in previous chapters, the visual arts put into practice what
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Phenomenology presents in theory. The purpose of this chapter, then, is to demonstrate
Faulkner’s acquaintance with modernist-art movements, particularly Cubism and
Surrealism. Though As I Lay Dying follows The Sound and the Fury chronologically,
these works belong to the same period in Faulkner’s literary development: The Sound and
the Fury was published in 1929, while As I Lay Dying was composed in 1929 and
published the year following. This chapter surveys criticism on the latter novel, which
incorporates modernist-art techniques into several characters’ perceptions. As critics
attest, As I Lay Dying makes bold thematic use of modernist art; for this reason, it helps
reinforce claims made in the previous chapter. Though the focus here remains on
criticism pertaining to Faulkner’s modernist-art techniques generally, some original
character-analysis (particularly with respect to Vardaman’s Surrealist imagination) will
be offered.
Written in only six weeks in 1929 and published in 1930, William Faulkner’s As I
Lay Dying recounts the story of the Bundrens, who live on a rural farm in Mississippi in
the 1920s. The story is narrated by fifteen characters over fifty-nine chapters. The title of
the novel is derived from Book XI of Homer’s Odyssey, where Agamemnon speaks to
Odysseus: “As I lay dying, the woman with the dog’s eyes would not close my eyes as I
descended into Hades” (566). The story narrates the Bundrens’ journey to bury their dead
mother.
Later in the novel, Darl Bundren makes specific reference to Cubism: “The front,
the conical façade with the square orifice of doorway broken only by the square squat
shape of the coffin on the sawhorses like a cubist bug, comes into relief” (AILD 219). As
Watson G. Branch notes, Darl’s description creates a “cubist painting by reducing the
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three-dimensional barn to geometric shapes—conical and square—flattened to the twodimensional surface of the façade with the coffin and sawhorses brought up to the plane
of the empty doorway” (117). Branch elaborates:
Darl often exhibits specific Cubist techniques in the verbal constructs by which he
expresses his view of the world: geometric patterns of juxtaposed forms, multiple
points of view, collages, emphasis on two-dimensional surface rather than threedimensional depth, and dislocation and disorientation of forms in space. (Branch
48)
In his study of Darl Bundren’s character, Watson G. Branch contends that Darl’s
experience “in France at the war” exposed him to Cubism, which then shapes his
imagination:
First, the war showed Darl absurd and wasteful death (and, by extension, absurd
and wasteful life) on a scale unimaginable to him had he remained at home in
Yoknapatawpha County. Second, the exposure to contemporary movements in the
plastic arts—especially Cubism, which had been prevalent in Paris for a decade
before American soldiers got there—provided Darl with a mode for conceiving
reality commensurate to the disorientation he felt. (42)
The war experience had traumatized Darl, slowly eroding his sanity. Branch quotes
Ronald Sutherland in this regard:
Darl has been overseas during the World War, which undoubtedly played havoc
with his sensitive nature, broadening his awareness and deepening his
sensibilities, creating a problem of readjustment to the temporarily forgotten
crudeness of home life—a grotesque kind of crudeness which the atmosphere of
the novel vividly impresses upon the reader. It is significant that Faulkner had
Darl avoid mention of the war until the last, when, on the train to Jackson, he is
rapidly losing his grips on sanity and is speaking of himself in the third person.
(Sutherland 543-44; qtd. in Branch 43-44)
In sum, Darl’s exposure to European art in France provided him with a “source for
certain imagery—imagery that is the major qualitative feature that sets his language apart
from that of the other characters” (Branch 44).
One might add that Darl retreats into Cubism as a mental escape from the traumas
of life past and present. By framing his suffering, Darl’s Cubism describes a desperate
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artistry. As Lothar Hӧnnighausen notes, “Darl, a persona of the artist, often adopts a
painterly view of the reality he so obsessively registers” (560; emphasis added).
Hӧnnighausen is right. However, Darl’s artistry is symptomatic of the man’s mental
fragmentation, suffering, and breakdown. It is his own shattered world that Darl frames
within the cold two-dimensionality of Cubist shapes. There is, perhaps, a paradox in
Faulkner’s use of Cubism, in that there is no healing through its constructs. Darl’s
“painterly view” (Hӧnnighausen 560) does not bring him more concretely “into the
world.” Rather, it marks his alienation and mental isolation.
Alienation, isolation, and fragmentation do not belong to Darl alone; these are
features of the “modernist condition” that artists contemporary to Faulkner sought to
explore and exploit—and, often, to critique. In his 1919 book, Quelques Intentions du
Cubisme, Maurice Raynal offered Cubism as a way of “knowing” that frees itself from
extraneous details:
To conceive an object is, in fact, to aim at knowing it in its essence, at
representing it in the mind … as purely as possible, as a sign, as a totem if you
like, absolutely free of all the useless details such as its aspects—accidental
factors which are too numerous and too changeable. (Raynal 152; qtd. in Tucker
395)
As describes it, the Cubist artist structures perception by a process of mental reduction. In
his book, The Moment of Cubism, John Berger explains:
[The cubists] reduced forms to a combination of cubes, cones, cylinders—or,
later, to arrangements of flatly articulated facets or planes with sharp edges—so
that the elements of one form were interchangeable with another, whether a hill, a
woman, a violin, a carafe, a table or a hand. Thus, as against the Cubist
discontinuity of space, they created a continuity of structure. (Berger 28)
It is John Tucker’s contention that Faulkner applied this same “visual logic” to the
structure of narrative (396).
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As Tucker notes, the journey of the Bundrens to Jefferson to bury their mother is
not a single story, but a recounting of experience by multiple narrators, each with its
distinctive “textual voice” (393):
Textual voice is not subordinate to representation. At the same time that the novel
disrupts mimetic voices and thus calls our attention to them as voices, it insists on
its identity as a text. In As I Lay Dying voices (mimetic and textual) are constantly
breaking the novel's perceptual “surface” (the print we see, the language we
recognize, the speakers we “hear”) into unexpected discursive planes, the way a
cubist painting shatters representational images so that the painting can assert the
image of itself. (Ross 308)
There is a paradox here, in that the Cubist “image” achieves its unity by “shatter[ing]” the
sorts of shifting temporal perceptions fostered by traditional, “representational” art. Thus,
when Tucker writes that “the novel as a whole exhibits specific cubist techniques” (391;
emphasis added), the “whole” that he references consists of a series of textual fragments
whose descriptions become arrested or frozen within or “dissolved” into abstract
geometric frames, shapes, and attitudes.
As Darryl Hattenhauer observes, “the geometric spatial abstractions in As I Lay
Dying inform the setting and the plot,” while “the spatiality of setting and plot in turn
shape the characters” (146). In effect, Faulkner’s modernist narrative technique reduces
characters (or reduces his narrators’ perceptions of characters, themselves often included)
to objets d’art. Addie rests in death, metamorphized into her coffin (AILD 88); Jewel and
Gillespie stand “like two figures in a Greek frieze” (AILD 221); Darl watches his brother
as he “crosses the floor in four strides with the rigid gravity of a cigar store Indian"
(AILD 4). Similar Cubist object-reductions recur throughout the narrative. Remaining
paragraphs will sample several of the visual techniques by means of which Faulkner
achieves these effects.
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Darryl Hattenhauer asserts that “the circle is associated with death” (146) in this
novel. He offers several examples. When Addie dies, Darl describes “her eyes … like
two candles when you watch them gutter down into the sockets of iron candle-sticks”
(AILD 8). When Vardaman witnesses Addie’s death his head, eyes, and mouth are
described in circular shapes. Later on, Darl represents Vardaman as being “round and his
eyes round and his mouth beginning to open" (AILD 47). In the same way, after Addie’s
death, Tull describes Vardaman “look[ing] at [him], his eyes round and black in the
middle like when you throw a light in a owl’s face” (AILD 70). Vardaman, who is
traumatized by his mother’s death, attempts to save Addie by carving round holes in her
coffin. In his despair, Vardaman repeatedly observes buzzards “in little tall black circles
on the sky” (AILD 197). Ironically, Addie is the center that holds the Bundrens
together—or, in Eric Sundquist’s words, “the center that no longer holds" (31). In sum,
the Bundren brothers are depicted within circular imagery. One might say that they long
for circles: Vardaman longs for a toy train that goes in circles, and Cash demands a
“graphophone” that plays in circles.
However, the most significant geometric abstraction in As I Lay Dying is the
“interplay of verticals and horizontals” (Hattenhauer 147). The most familiar example of
“verticality transformed into horizontality” is the tree, since “Addie’s coffin and the
wagon that carries it are both images of trees turned into horizontal planks” (Hattenhauer
147). Indeed, the description of Addie’s coffin contains a Cubist pictogram. Tull
observes:
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They had laid her in it reversed. Cash made it clock-shape, like this with every
joint and seam
bevelled and scrubbed with the plane, tight
as a drum and neat as
a sewing basket, and they had laid her in it
head to foot so it
wouldn’t crush her dress. (AILD 88)
Citing Raynal’s comment—that “cubism attempts through simplification to eliminate the
changeable”—Tucker analyzes Addie’s reduction to the “status of totem” (396). Laid in
the coffin, Addie becomes a “polyhedron, a form utterly protean, an angular seed or egg
seething with perverse life and eager for metempsychosis,” “a cubistic bug” (Tucker
396).
In addition to these Cubist object-reductions, Faulkner makes allusions to
sculpture. Such descriptions as “the square squat shape of the coffin on the sawhorses
like a cubistic bug” (AILD 219) and “running against the glare like that figure cut from
tin” (AILD 221) move from the two-dimensional canvas to three-dimensional
compositions of wood and metal. When Dewey Dell looks down at her mother’s face, “it
is like a casting of fading bronze upon the pillow” (AILD 51). Lothar Hӧnninghausen
notes other sculptural effects, like Darl’s observation of Jewel and his horse: “Save for
Jewel’s legs they are like two figures carved for a tableau savage in the sun” (AILD 12).
Continuing the Cubist emphasis, Tucker compares Jewel’s relationship with his horse to
Marcel Duchamp’s Nude Descending a Staircase, No. 2. Depicting a “sexual-filial
relation, the wooden Jewel [is] borne into the windy heights of Anse's farm by a wooden
horse” (Tucker 398).
While Tucker’s interpretation makes sense, another possible influence can be
found in Surrealism. Where, one might ask, are the circles and planes in the following
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fantastical description? Jewel’s horse reacts to a whistle, “moving that quick his coat,
bunching, tongues swirling like so many flames”:
When Jewel can almost touch him, the horse stands on his hind legs and slashes
down at Jewel. Then Jewel is enclosed by a glittering maze of hooves as by an
illusion of wings; among them, beneath the up-reared chest, he moves with the
flashing limberness of a snake. For an instant before the jerk comes onto his arms
he sees his whole body earth-free, horizontal, whipping snake-limber, until he
finds the horse's nostrils and touches earth again. (AILD 12)
Critics like Tucker err, perhaps, in ascribing too much to Cubism and too little to
Surrealism. Cubism may “shatter” the natural perspectives and hidden sides of the objectworld, but it is not known for fantastic metamorphoses, as described above. The horse
raises up and, in an instant, grows “an illusion” of Pegasus “wings,” and then, an instant
later, shows the “flashing limberness of a snake.” This is more than Cubism.
Hӧnninghausen argues that Faulkner employs synaesthesia “to dissolve the
traditionally holistic picture of reality into the perception of details and to dramatize”
through the viewpoints of Darl and Vardaman (569):
It is as though the dark were resolving him out of his integrity, into an unrelated
scattering of components flames …. I see him dissolve—legs, a rolling eye, a
gaudy splotching like cold flames—and float upon the dark. (AILD 56)
One might read the description above, not through the circles and planes of Cubism, but
rather through the more fluid fantasies of Surrealism. The same can be said of the
following passage:
The air smells like sulphur. Upon the impalpable plane of it their shadows form as
upon a wall, as though like sound they had not gone very far away in falling but
had merely congealed for a moment. (AILD 76)
In its reference to “shadow,” the above passage recalls the painterly technique of “cast
shadow,” where “a shadow of more or less definite shape [is] formed on a surface behind
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a body that blocks the light” (Pierce 87). A variant of shadowing, chiaroscuro, is the
“gradation of light and dark within a picture, especially one in which the forms are
largely determined, not by sharp outlines, but by the meeting of lighter and darker areas”
(Pierce 19). Faulkner uses shadowing and cast shadow in As I Lay Dying in many
sections of the novel, but most notably in Vardaman’s section. Vardaman, the
traumatized child of the Bundrens, is also the one who is granted a Surrealist painter’s
eyes. For example, Vardaman sees “the dark stand up and go whirling away” (AILD 65).
A few lines later, he observes “Pa walk[ing] around. His shadow walks around” (65). In
several places, he repeats the phrase, “He walks around. His shadow walks around” (66)
or “Pa walks around. His shadow does” (66). Though painted after Faulkner, Remedios
Varo’s 1962 painting, titled Fenomeno (“Phenomenon”), shows the resources inherent in
this technique.
In his Surrealist imaginings, Vardaman sees his mother as fish and horse
simultaneously. He perceives her as a fish “cut up into pieces of not-fish now” (AILD
53). Like Darl’s retreat into Cubism, Vardaman retreats into Surrealism as a defense
against the truth of her death, which has traumatized him severely. As if to defer his
recognition of the irreversible tragedy, Vardaman dissects his mother’s image. There is
even a chapter consisting of one sentence only: “My mother is a fish” (AILD 84).
In As I Lay Dying, Faulkner demonstrates his mastery of modernist-art
techniques, which he has transferred from the painted canvas to narrative fiction. As
Tucker writes, “the novel as a whole exhibits specific cubist techniques” (391). These
techniques affect the perceptions of individual characters, Darl especially. Surrealism is
also an influence, though its impact is focused primarily on Vardaman. It is not surprising
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that different characters would imagine the object-world uniquely, since their
personalities and perceptions are unique.
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CONCLUSION

The beginning decades of the twentieth century appear to have had revolutionary
changes in many disciplines, such as philosophy, the visual arts, music, and literature.
This rapid change is more vivid in the appearance of Phenomenology in philosophy and
in Cubism in art. What connects these movements—despite of their contradictions and
differences—is modernism, which, during the first decades of the twentieth century,
explored new “ways of seeing” in art and “new ways of knowing” in philosophy. As
noted in the Introduction to this thesis, Phenomenology is a theory whose destination is
practice; its practice culminates in what Husserl terms the “transcendental attitude.”
Cubism, by contrast, is a practice that gives birth to theory—specifically, a theory of
constructionism.
William Faulkner’s literary art provides a sample for that correlation between
Husserl’s Phenomenology and Cubism. Faulkner is known to have employed modernist
art techniques in his novels, particularly The Sound and The Fury and As I Lay Dying. By
dwelling on the perceptions of characters, his novels also give insight into the workings
of Husserlian Phenomenology. Having given samples of these twin traditions in
Faulkner’s fiction, this thesis comes to an end.
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